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CRIMINAL LAW
I.

STATE'S USE OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES MADE MORE DIFFICULT TO
CHALLENGE ON GROUNDS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

In State v. Howard' the South Carolina Supreme Court considered
the issue of racial discrimination in the state's use of peremptory challenges. The court concluded the state's reasons for striking jurors sufficiently complied with the requirements of Batson v. Kentucky.2 The
court needed only eleven sentences in Howard to dispose of the Batson
issue, upholding the trial court's finding that the state's non-racial reasons had successfully rebutted the defendants' prima facie case of discrimination.3 Although the court offered little discussion on this issue,
analysis of the case exposes some of the problems currently associated
with Batson claims in South Carolina.
Ronnie Howard and Dana Ricardo Weldon, black males, were
jointly tried in a capital case in Greenville County on June 9, 1986, for
murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and conspiracy. After juror qualification, a panel of thirty-five whites and seven blacks remained prospective jurors.4 The state used its peremptory strikes 5 to excuse six of
the seven blacks from the panel. 6 The defendants objected, claiming
the state's use of its peremptory challenges was racially motivated and

thus violative of Batson.7 The trial court found the defendants had
established a prima facie case of discrimination and required the state
to divulge its reasons for striking the six blacks.'

1. 295 S.C. 462, 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174 (1989).
2. Id. at 466, 369 S.E.2d at 134 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).

3. Id.
4. Record at 840.

5. The state is allowed ten peremptory challenges "when there is more than one
defendant jointly tried" in felony cases. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1110 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1988).

6. Record at 840.
7. Id. at 840-41.
8. Id. at 841-42. The state offered the following reasons for striking the six prospective jurors:
Jeffery Dunbar - "[B]ecause he said on two occasions that he could not vote for the
death penalty . . . [and] because he had just finished high school and because of his
age." Id. at 842.
Montain Jones - Because she "said that she was not really for the death pen*alty.
She said there was always a better way around it. I also struck her because of age. She
was twenty-three .... [and also] because of a very unstable work history. . . . [S]he
went approximately one year without a job." Id. at 843.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1989

1

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 6

After hearing the state's reasons and allowing the defendants an
opportunity to argue that the reasons were not legitimate, the trial
court concluded the state had successfully rebutted the prima facie
case.0 Jury selection continued and the state ultimately used two more
strikes to remove blacks from slots as alternate jurors. 0 The defendants renewed their Batson motion." The state again was required to
give its reasons for the strikes,' 2 but ultimately the court agreed the
state had met its burden of showing nonracial motives and upheld the
strikes. 13

On June 13, 1986, a jury composed of eleven whites and one black
found both Howard and Weldon guilty as charged and sentenced both
to death for murder, twenty-five years for armed robbery, and five
years for conspiracy. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's conviction and sentencing of Howard. The court affirmed
Weldon's conviction, but reversed
and remanded his case to the lower
4
court for new sentencing.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, summarily disposing of How-

Amanda Jean Fuller - Because "she was twenty-two years old. I struck her because
of age, because of an unstable work history ... and because she said she was indifferent
about the death penalty and ... could not commit generally for or generally against the
death penalty." Id.
Edward Wood - Because he "said he leans toward life every time. He was more
pro-life. He said he was not really for the death penalty. He also said as a general rule he
was against the death penalty." Id. at 843-44.
Charles Copeland -

"[B]ecause he said from ...

a religious standpoint he would

find it hard to vote for the death penalty. . . . [I]t would have to be [sic] very extreme
case for him to vote for the death penalty." Id. at 844.
Postell Hunter - Because "in 1982 [the state] had a case on him for assault and
[The Solicitor] was afraid of an adverbattery of a high and aggravated nature ....
sarial relationship with him." Id.
9. Id. at 849.
10. Id. at 1017-18.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1018. The state gave the following reasons for striking the two black
alternates:
Gladys McElrath - Because "she absolutely stated that she did not believe in capital punishment.., and she would vote for life." Id. at 1019.
Antonio Golden - "[B]ecause of an erratic work history. She had worked two
months at her last job. Her husband was not working." Id. The court balked at accepting
this reason and asked for another. Id. at 1020-22. The solicitor then stated that his "neutral and detached explanation is that [the state] was left with three strikes. The Defense
had none ....
[T]he next two jurors [in the solicitor's opinion] were much more strong
[sic] than she was." Id. at 1022.
13. Id. at 1023.
14. Howard, 295 S.C. at 474, 369 S.E.2d at 138, 139. Howard petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari based on two claims, one of which was the
Batson issue. The Supreme Court denied Howard's petition. See Howard v. South Carolina, 109 S. Ct. 3174 (1989) (mem).
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ard and Weldon's claims of racial discrimination, stated that Batson
requires "a neutral explanation. . related to the particular case...
[which] need not rise to the level of justification for a challenge for
cause.""' Acknowledging only the "[s]olicitor's articulated reasons concern[ing] these [challenged] jurors' perceived attitudes to the death
court
penalty,"'" the court held that on the record before it the trial
7
had satisfactorily complied with the requirements of Batson.
In Batson the United States Supreme Court held that the equal
protection clause prevented prosecutors from using their peremptory
challenges to strike jurors based on race.' The Court stated that a defendant could establish a prima facie case of "purposeful discrimination" in the following ways: (1) by showing "that he is a member of a
cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove [from the group of prospective jurors] members of defendant's race"; 19 (2) by relying on the fact "that peremptory
challenges constitute a jury selection that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate' -;2o and (3) by showing that
"these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude" potential jurors on
the basis of their race.2
Upon the defendant's showing of a prima facie case, the state then
has the burden of "articulat[ing] a neutral explanation related to the
particular case" supporting why the potential juror was struck.2 ' The
Court compared the required process with that used in employment
discrimination claims brought under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.23 The Batson Court failed, however, to establish any other guide-

15. Howard, 295 S.C. at 466, 369 S.E.2d at 134 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 97 (1986)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
19. Id. at 96 (citation omitted). Both Batson and State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 358
S.E.2d 701 (1987), use the term "cognizable racial group." Therefore, whites should also
be allowed to take advantage of Batson.
20. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 98.
23. Id. at 94, 96, 98 nn.18-19 & 21 (referring to title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1982), which addresses cases of employment discrimination); see Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme Court in these two cases established a threestep procedure to be followed in title VII cases. First, the complainant must show a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. This burden is not onerous. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 253. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
to rebut this prima facie case. The burden is one of production and not persuasion. The
burden of persuasion is always upon the complainant. Id. Finally, if the defendant suc-
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lines for state courts to use in applying this decision. Therefore, each
state was faced with the task of implementing its own rules for applying Batson. This was the task with which the court in Howard was
faced.
After the defendants objected to the state's use of its peremptory
strikes in Howard, the trial court ruled that the burden was on the
state "to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging the
black jurors," because "when you strike six out of seven . . . blacks,
'
that establishes - that makes a prima facie showing."24
The state, as
required, gave the previously stated reasons for the strikes. The court,
in effect, then gave the defendants an opportunity to show pretext
when it asked if there was "[a]nything the [d]efendants wish[ed] to
put on the record on this issue. ' 25 The defendants attempted, mostly
by "recollection" and "without the benefit of transcripts of the precise
testimony,"2 to point out a few problems with the state's reasons. The
defendants concluded that they were sure that there were "other disparities. ' 27 Nevertheless, the court accepted the state's reasons and de28
nied the defendants' motion to quash the jury.
The United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Batson
less than two months before the trial court's decision in Howard. Understandably, both the judge and the attorneys in Howard were unclear as to what exact procedure should be followed in the situation
presented. 2 The South Carolina Supreme Court attempted to rectify
this uncertainty in State v. Jones.3 The Jones court established the
procedure to be followed in South Carolina when Batson claims are
made and the decision has been praised as a positive step toward
31
proper application of Batson.
The trial court in Howard, however, readily found a prima facie
case of racial discrimination even before Jones. Howard raises ques-

ceeds in rebutting the prima facie case, then the complainant "must be afforded a fair
opportunity to demonstrate that [the] assigned reason ... was a pretext or discriminatory in its application." Green, 411 U.S. at 807.

24. Record at 841.
25. Id. at 844.
26. Id. at 845.
27. Id. at 846.
28. Id. at 849.
29. See id. at 840-49, 1017-23.
30. 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987). The Jones court "recommended] that the
trial court hold a Batson hearing whenever 1) the defendant requests such a hearing; 2)
the defendant is a member of cognizable racial group; and 3) the prosecutor exercises
peremptory challenges to remove members of defendant's race from the venire." Id. at
57-58, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
31. See Nature of Peremptory Challenges Altered, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 40 S.C.L. REv. 41 (1988).
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tions about South Carolina courts' substantive examination of the Batson claims rather than the procedural process in these situations.
According to the United States Supreme Court, whether a state
has exercised its peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner based
on the race of potential jurors is an issue of equal protection.32 Once
the defense succeeds in raising a prima facie case (which after Jones
should be easy to do in South Carolina), then by definition a presumption exists that the state has discriminated against some veniremen by
classifying them, because of their race, as unfit jurors.
Any classification based on race is a suspect classification.

3

The

courts must examine such classifications with strict scrutiny and allow
such a classification to exist only if the state can show the classification
is "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination. . .

."3

A court should

find that the state has rebutted the prima facie case only if there is a
"legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification." 35
A court might accomplish this requirement of strict scrutinization
by ensuring that the state rebutted the prima facie case only when its
reasons for striking jurors are both relevant to the particular case and
consistently applied to all veniremen. Batson stated that the prosecutor's reasons for striking a juror must be "related to the particular case37
to be tried."3 6 A Florida District Court of Appeal in Slappy v. State
agreed that relevance is important, stating that if "the reason given for
the challenge is unrelated to the facts of the case," that factor will
"weigh heavily" against the legitimacy of the state's racially neutral
explanation.

38

The state's reasons must not be merely relevant, but also must be
applied consistently to similarly situated jurors of all races. Former

32. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
33. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's miscegenation statute because it was in violation of the equal protection clause).
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id.
36. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
37. 503 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), af'd, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2873 (1988). Sloppy was decided under a state court decision prior to
Batson which, like Batson, required an explanation for apparently discriminatory
strikes. Slappy also discussed People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (1978), which held that the California Constitution prohibited racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges and listed specific bias as an acceptable reason for a strike. Specific bias was defined as "a bias relating to the particular case on
trial or the parties, or witnesses thereto." Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
902.
38. Slappy, 503 So. 2d at 355.
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South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Ness recognized the importance of consistency in his strong dissent in State v.Martinez.s9

Justice Finney's dissent in Howard also focused on what he believed to
be the state's failure to apply consistently its reasons for striking

blacks similarly situated to whites.40 The Slappy court also discussed
the necessity of consistency, stating that another factor weighing
against the state's given reasons in that case was "disparate treatment
where there [was] no difference between responses given to the same
question by challenged and unchallenged venire persons.""'
Justice Finney did not agree that the state had rebutted the prima
facie case of discrimination in Howard. A careful examination of the
relevance and consistency of the state's articulated reasons for striking
the blacks in Howard gives much support to Justice Finney's statement that "the solicitor did not use his peremptory challenges in a
nondiscriminatory manner .... ,42

One of the state's articulated reasons for striking black jurors was
their age: juror Dunbar was twenty; juror Fuller was twenty-two; and
juror Jones was twenty-three. It is difficult to believe that age is a relevant criteria for striking jurors in this case. Nevertheless, even if it
were relevant, this reason still is flawed because it was not applied to
similarly situated whites. Four white jurors were acceptable to the
state, even though they were in their early twenties: Debra Ann Bradley was twenty; Emily Bagwell was twenty-two; Tasha Mathis was
twenty-two; and William Miller was twenty-five.43
The next reason offered by the state for striking blacks was their
erratic employment history. Four blacks were struck because they had
been employed at their present job for less than a year: Fuller had
been at her place of employment for nine months, Jones for six
months, Dunbar for almost four months, and Golden for two months."
39. 294 S.C. 72, 75, 362 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1987) (Ness, C.J., dissenting).
40. Howard, 295 S.C. at 475, 369 S.E.2d at 139 (Finney, J., dissenting).
41. Slappy, 503 So. 2d at 355. The Florida court found that the state's reasons
were not applied consistently when a black school teacher was struck from a group of
prospective jurors for being too liberal, but a white school teacher with comparable views
was acceptable. Id.
42. Howard, 295 S.C. at 475, 369 S.E.2d at 139 (Finney, J., dissenting).
43. See Record at 1782-85. The state also struck white jurors Hooper, age twentythree, and Teague, age twenty. The state was not required to give reasons for these
strikes. See id.
44. Id. at 137. In its brief to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the state asserted
that juror Fuller's "response as to how long she had been employed at Burger King was
somewhat inconsistent with her answer on voir dire." Brief of Respondent at 6. Fuller
had previously answered that she had been employed at Burger King for nine months.
Record at 1783. She later, on voir dire by the solicitor, answered that she had been
working at Burger King "[a]bout a year now." Record at 451.
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Again, it is difficult to accept the relevancy of this reason. Even accepting its relevance, however, this reason should also fail for lack of
consistent application. The state accepted five veniremen who by the
state's own standards had erratic work histories: Emily Bagwell was
unemployed; Shirley Wooten had been working at her present job only
six months; Beryl Bair only four months; Debra Bradley only ten
months; and William Miller only six months. Additionally, Bagwell,
Bradley, and Miller, were also in their early twenties. 5
The state's final articulated reason for striking these blacks was
based on their views toward capital punishment. While it is unquestionable that a potential juror's view toward the death penalty is relevant in a capital murder case, this reason also must fall because it was
not consistently applied to whites with similar views.
Black juror Dunbar was struck because he twice stated that he
could not vote for the death penalty. It was subsequently revealed during voir dire, however, that he had been confused by the question and
was not only for the death penalty, but in fact wanted to be a police
officer.4" In contrast, white venireman Floyd Rohm was acceptable to
the state even though he had stated three times that he was not certain that he could vote for the death penalty. 47 Nevertheless, the state
accepted him because he later stated that he could, if necessary and
along with the other jurors, sign his name to a "death warrant."4
Moreover, Richard Ashmore, a white venireman, stated that he
could vote for the death penalty, but only in "extreme" circumstances. 4 9 White juror Sharon Lunny stated that she was generally
against capital punishment and that it should be reserved for the most

The trial court did not accept the employment reason for striking juror Golden because it had been pointed out during voir dire that she had three small children. The
court asked for another reason and the solicitor stated that she was struck because later
jurors had stronger views on the death penalty. Record at 1020. Juror Golden, however,
had stated, "I believe in the death penalty." Record at 951.
45. Record at 1782-85. The state gave age and work history as reasons for striking
Dunbar, Jones, and Fuller. See supra notes 8 & 44.
46. Record at 135, 147.
47. See id. at 156.
48. Id. at 161. Of the eight whites whose backgrounds are at least somewhat com-

parable to the eight blacks struck, the state asked all but one if they could sign a "death
warrant." All replied affirmatively. The state, however, asked this question of only one
black, Postell Hunter, who was struck because of a feared adversarial relationship. See
supra note 8. Such questioning suggests consideration should be given to the Slappy
court's citing of "disparate examination of the challenged juror" as another reason
"weigh[ing] heavily against the legitimacy of any race-neutral explanation." Slappy v.
State, 503 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), afld, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2873 (1988).
49. Record at 716-17.
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"heinous crimes."50 Nonetheless, both were acceptable to the state,
even though Jones, Wood, Copeland, and McElrath, all black, were
struck despite their statements that they could vote for the death penalty under certain circumstances.5 1
In light of these facts, the state's reasons should have failed a
strict scrutiny examination because of lack of consistency, and arguably, relevance as well. The transcript gives much support to Justice
Finney's dissent in Howard. Nevertheless, the other four members of
the South Carolina Supreme Court considered the state's reasons sufficient to rebut the prima facie case.
This holding will make it even more difficult for defendants to succeed on Batson claims in South Carolina. Until the United States Supreme Court clarifies the Batson issue, or until the South Carolina Supreme Court voluntarily becomes more receptive to Batson claims,
prudent defense counsel should raise relevance and consistency arguments at trial. Such a practice will force the state to articulate only
relevant2 reasons consistently applied to any peremptory strikes of
5
jurors.
Kenneth Lawton Frederick

50. Id. at 813-15.
51. See id. at 331-32, 556-68, 679-80, 791-92.
52. Defense counsel might also argue that the sixth amendment entitles defendants
to an impartial petit jury (not merely a jury venire) drawn from a representative crosssection of the community. This argument was made in Batson, but the Court decided
Batson on equal protection grounds, and thus did not reach the sixth amendment
argument.
The Supreme Court recently discussed this issue, however, in Teague v. Lane, 109 S.
Ct. 1060 (1989). Teague reached the Court by petition for writ of habeas corpus. The
petitioner made several claims, including the argument that Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975) (holding the sixth amendment required that the jury venire be drawn
from a fair cross section of the community), should be extended to include the petit jury.
In a plurality opinion, Justice O'Conner (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy) failed to reach the sixth amendment question. The opinion
announced a new standard regarding retroactivity of criminal procedure rules: new constitutional rules of criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively on collateral
review unless the new rule at issue falls within an exception. See Teague, 109 S.Ct. at
1075. Since the Teague opinion concluded that the absence of a fair cross-section on a
petit jury would not fall within an exception, the sixth amendment question was not
reached. See id.
Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall) dissented from the plurality's adoption
of the new standard for determining whether a decision should be retroactively applied.
In so doing, they implied that if the sixth amendment claim was upheld, it could have an
even broader application than Batson's equal protection argument. See id. at 1092
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan thus suggested that a sixth amendment argument could be made by a defendant even if the defendant was not himself a member of
the racial group improperly struck from the jury. Accordingly, defense counsel should
raise a Teague claim on direct appeal and attempt to force the Court to deal squarely
with this sixth amendment issue.
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DISCLOSURE OF INFORMANT'S IDENTITY REQUIRED WHEN INFORMANT
ARRANGES SALE OF CONTRABAND

In State v. Burns53 the South Carolina Supreme Court decided
two important issues regarding-the compelled disclosure of an informant's identity. First, relying solely on the lower court's determination

that the informant was material to the defendant's case, the supreme
court ruled that the informant's identity had to be disclosed.5 The informant had neither witnessed nor participated in the offense, which
traditionally has been the major criterion in determining an informant's materiality. Thus, the circumstances under which an informant
may be found material were expanded. Second, the court held that

when disclosure is proper, the state must supply not only the informant's name, but also any additional information in its possession that
would aid the defendant in a search for the informant.5 This increases
the amount of disclosure that will satisfy the court.
In Burns an unidentified informant revealed to the Charleston police that the defendant, John Henry Burns, had received a large ship-

ment of narcotics. Unable to corroborate this information, the police
sought the assistance of a second informant, Jim Woods. Woods telephoned the defendant and arranged a sale of drugs at a specific location. The call was not recorded. The police proceeded to a specified
location where they stopped, questioned, and frisked Burns. A police
officer saw a film container in Burns' car and found it contained cocaine. The entire car was searched and additional drugs were found.
The police charged Burns with two counts of possession of controlled
56
substances with intent to distribute.
On February 6, 1986, the lower court conducted a hearing and ordered the disclosure of the informant's identity after the state conceded the informant was material to Burns' defense. 7 Pursuant to this
ruling the state produced only the informant's name, Jim Woods. Immediately before trial, Burns moved for a continuance to locate Woods.
The motion was denied. Burns appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court's decision and remanded
the case for a new trial.5 8
Burns relied on Roviaro v. United States,9 the leading case on
informant disclosure, to compel disclosure. In Roviaro the Court or-

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

294 S.C. 338, 364 S.E.2d 465 (1988).
Id. at 341, 364 S.E.2d at 467.
Id.
Id. at 339, 364 S.E.2d at 466.
Brief of Appellant at 9.
Burns, 294 S.C. at 341, 364 S.E.2d at 466.
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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dered disclosure of the identity of an informant who had actively participated in an illegal drug transaction. The Court held that when disclosure "is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege [to withhold
an informant's identity] must give way."8 0 The Court further stated:
The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case,

taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the
possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant
factors."1
In Roviaro, however, the informant was the only participant who
could contradict the agent's testimony, other than the defendant himself. 2 Conversely, the informant in Burns was not present during the

offense and, therefore, would be unable to contradict the police. The
majority of courts that have applied the Roviaro balancing test have
classified informants into one of three categories: (1) witness; (2) participant; or (3) mere tipster. 3 If the informant is classified as a mere
tipster, his identity is privileged.64 If, however, the informant is classified as a witness or participant (i.e. a material witness on the issue of
guilt), disclosure may be required. 5 An informant who is neither a witness nor a participant, but merely arranges a sale, as did the informant
in Burns, is not as neatly classified. Some jurisdictions hold that such
an informant is not a mere tipster and his identity is not privileged. 6
Many courts do not rely as heavily on classification of the inform-

60. Id. at 60-61.
61. Id. at 62.
62. Id. at 64. A federal agent was hidden in the trunk of the informant's car, but
the Court held the agent's testimony "was hardly a substitute for an opportunity to examine the man who had been nearest to him and took part in the transaction." Id.
63. See, State v. Diamond, 280 S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (1984); People v. Diaz, 174
Cal. App. 2d 799, 345 P.2d 370 (1959); Thornton v. State, 239 Ga. 693, 238 S.E.2d 376
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1073 (1978); State v. Nelson, 395 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa Ct.

App. 1986).
64. State v. Batson, 261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517 (1973); United States v. Freund,

525 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Burrell, 720 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1983);
People v. McCoy, 13 Cal. App. 3d 6, 91 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1970); State v. Martin, 156 Ga.
App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129 (1980).
65. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129.
66. See Diamond, 280 S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (informant is a participant when he
sets up the transaction); Taylor v. State, 136 Ga. App. 31, 220 S.E.2d 49 (1975) (informant who arranges a sale of contraband with the defendant becomes a participant); see
also People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 434 P.2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967) (nonparticipant informant can be a material witness).
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ant when, as in Burns, the defendant has claimed entrapment.17 Classification is rendered less important because the informant's testimony
becomes material to the defense.6 8 Some courts, though, are reluctant
to compel disclosure "upon a mere 'speculation' that the informant
could produce evidence favorable to the defense."' 9 In Burns the defendant posed several possibilities suggesting how Woods' testimony
may have been material to his defense. "He may have admitted Defendant was 'framed.' He may have admitted he didn't speak with Defendant on the phone or contradicted police testimony as to what was
sold or as to various other factors in their determination of probable
cause."70 Furthermore, many jurisdictions hold that simply because an
informant is material to a determination of probable cause does not
make him material to the defendant's case (i.e. essential to a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence). 7 1
In Burns the court also held that once the materiality of an informant has been established, "[t]he right of an accused to learn the
identity of an informant includes more than the state's revelation of
the informant's name. '72 This holding is in accord with the majority of
jurisdictions.7 3 Most courts only require the state to use reasonable efforts in disclosing identifying information. 74 Rarely do courts impose
an affirmative duty to locate the informant and ensure his presence at

67. See United States v. Price, 783 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1986); People v. McShann,
50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958); People v. McCoy, 13 Cal. App. 3d 6, 91 Cal. Rptr. 357
(1970); State v. Nelson, 395 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986); State v. Gill, 22 Or. App.
484, 539 P.2d 1138 (1975).
68. See Gill, 22 Or. App. 484, 539 P.2d 1138.
69. McCoy, 13 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 361; see also Nelson, 395
N.W.2d at 653 (mere speculation as to the informant's testimony can not overcome the
public interest in protecting the informant); Gill, 22 Or. App. at 487, 539 P.2d at 1140
("[I]f the simple assertion by a defendant that he was entrapped . . .is sufficient to
require the revelation of the name of the undisclosed informers, then the use of informers as a source of information ...

will quickly come to an end.").

70. Brief of Appellant at 8-9.
71. See Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 158, 231 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1977) (Disclosure of
an informant's identity is not necessary when "the question is a preliminary one of probable cause and guilt or innocence is not at stake."(quoting McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 3il (1967))); State v. Diamond, 280 S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (1984); State v. Batson,
261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517 (1973); Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d
234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972); State v. Kirksey, 418 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
72. Burns, 294 S.C. at 340, 364 S.E.2d at 467.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 496 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1974); United States
v. Goss, 237 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 464
P.2d 42, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1970); State v. Logan, 79 N.C. App. 420, 339 S.E.2d 449
(1986).
74. See, e.g., Renzi v. Virginia, 794 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1986); Williams, 496 F.2d
378.
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trial.

By accepting the lower court's determination regarding the informant's materiality, the court in Burns expanded the circumstances
under which an informant is deemed material. The lower court had
established the informant's materiality only after the state conceded to
it for purposes of a preliminary hearing. Without a proper judicial determination, which may have found the informant's disclosure unnecessary, the court indirectly expanded the definition of materiality to
include a nonparticipant who might testify in accord with a defendant's otherwise unsupported claim of entrapment. Without any evidence to support his assertions of entrapment, Burns merely speculated that Woods' testimony would contradict other evidence.
Furthermore, after ordering disclosure the court required the state to
reveal more identifying information than the informant's name. It held
that any additional identifying information in the state's possession is
also subject to disclosure. This holding is in accord with a number of
other jurisdictions that have considered the issue.
Valerie L. Brumfield

III. NONDISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
PROSECUTION AND WITNESS HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF ORDER PURSUANT
TO BRADY MOTION; COURT DEFINES WHEN OFFENDER HAS MURDERED AS
"AGENT OF ANOTHER"

In State v. Cain the South Carolina Supreme Court expanded
the law controlling criminal prosecutions and the death penalty in two
significant ways. First, the court examined potential Brady motion"7
violations and held negotiations between the prosecutor and a codefendant witness are not material and they need not be revealed
under a Brady motion.78 Second, the court examined the statutory aggravating circumstances justifying the death penalty and held that
when a defendant commits murder after motivation from another, the
death penalty is justified.79 These two holdings clearly expand the cur-

75. E.g., State v. Brockenborough, 45 N.C. App. 121, 262 S.E.2d 330 (1980).
76. 297 S.C. 497, 377 S.E.2d 556 (1988), petition for cert. filed, - S.C. -S.E.2d

-

(S.C. May 22, 1989) (No. 22914).

77. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that defense counsel has the right to discover information about a case from the prosecution.
The procedure established was for the defense to make a motion before the court for the
requested disclosure. These motions became known as Brady motions.

78. Cain, 297 S.C. at 503, 377 S.E.2d at 559.
79. Id. at 508, 377 S.E.2d at 562.
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rent law and may violate the United States Constitution.
Of major practical significance is the court's handling of the prosecution's failure to advise defense counsel of "negotiations" which had
occurred between the prosecution and co-defendant Kenneth Dale
Threatte. Threatte was the prosecution's primary witness in the conviction of James Russell Cain. At trial, Threatte testified that nothing
had been promised him in return for his testimony. Threatte's plea
hearing for the same counts of murder and armed robbery was held
five days after Cain's conviction. Pursuant to certain discussions and
negotiations between the solicitor and Threatte's attorney, Threatte
plead guilty to one count of murder and the state withdrew its notice
of intention to seek the death penalty. The remaining indictments for
armed robbery and murder were nol prossed. Threatte was sentenced
to life imprisonment.8 0
The court distinguished State v. Hinson,81 a similar case decided
one year earlier. In Hinson the prosecutor announced "moments after"
the testimony of the co-defendant that the co-defendant would not be
prosecuted. 2 Hinson was convicted of drug trafficking and appealed.
The supreme court affirmed the conviction, but because the timing of
the announcement strongly suggested an undisclosed promise, it remanded the case to the lower court with orders to determine whether
the prosecution
failed to disclose a promise of immunity to the
83
witness.
In Cain the court held that no evidence gave rise to an inference
that an undisclosed immunity grant or plea bargain existed.84 The
court believed the five day lapse between Threatte's testimony in
Cain's trial and his own plea was ample time for negotiations to have
taken place.8 5 Thus, the court held that the solicitor's decisions were
logical, given the testimony and physical evidence presented during
Cain's trial.8" The court went further to state that even if an assurance
to Threatte was not disclosed, reversal was not constitutionally
mandated.

7

Citing United States v. Bagley,8 the South Carolina Supreme
Court stated that only material disclosures are required. The court defined evidence as material only if it is reasonably probable that disclo-

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 502, 377 S.E.2d at 559.
293 S.C. 406, 361 S.E.2d 120 (1987).
Id. at 407, 361 S.E.2d at 120.
Id. at 408, 361 S.E.2d at 121.
Cain, 297 S.C. at 503, 377 S.E.2d at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id.
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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sure of the evidence to the defense would have resulted in a different
outcome at the proceeding. 9 The court failed to recognize the important ramifications of its definition for this case.
The court used this test only in its examination of the guilt phase
of Cain's trial. Since evidence presented at the guilt phase of a trial is
also considered during the penalty phase, 90 the court should have considered how the failure to disclose this information would affect the
penalty phase. Bagley dealt with a narcotics conviction, not a capital
crime., 1 This fact is significant since capital crimes receive heightened
scrutiny.9 2 The court failed to give this capital case the level of scrutiny
a capital case warrants.
In addition to the Brady motion issue, the court also addressed
the issue of when a murder is committed "for another." The state
based its request for the death penalty for Cain on alleged statutory
aggravating circumstances. It cited in support of its allegation of aggravating circumstances South Carolina Code section 16-3-20(C)(a)(6),93
which provides, "The offender caused or directed another to commit
murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another." 94
The trial judge charged that the "agent or employee" aggravating
circumstance was broad enough to include those who murder "on behalf of another." 9 Threatte provided testimony that Cain had committed the murders for his mother, apparently on behalf of her narcotics

89. Cain, 297 S.C. at 503, 377 S.E.2d at 559. In so defining "material" the court
followed its previous statements in State v.Hinson, 293 S.C. 406, 361 S.E.2d 120 (1987),
that "[e]vidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that the result of trial
would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense." Id. at 408,
361 S.E.2d at 120.
90. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983) (Court relying on Georgia Supreme Court's response to certified question in which the Georgia court stated, "In making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder takes into consideration all circumstances before it from both the guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial."
Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 100, 297 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1982)).
91. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667. The differences between Bagley and Cain do not stop at
the level of punishment. The witnesses involved in Bagley were state law enforcement
officers who received $300.00 from federal agents for their testimony, not co-defendants
receiving plea bargains. See id. at 671. Moreover, the officers' testimony related almost
exclusively to firearms charges of which the defendants were acquitted. See id. at 673.
In State v. Hinson, 293 S.C. 406, 361 S.E.2d 120 (1987), the South Carolina Supreme
Court dealt with a narcotic's charge, more similar to Bagley than the instant case. In
Hinson, however, the court was dealing with the granting of immunity to a co-defendant.
Nonetheless, in Hinson the court found prejudicial error.
92. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 885 ("[T]he severity of the sentence mandates careful
scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error.").
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
94. Id.
95. Cain, 297 S.C. at 505, 377 S.E.2d at 560.
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drug trade." The South Carolina Supreme Court held that to restrict
the definition of agent to one who receives something of value in exchange for services rendered would duplicate section
16-3-20(C)(a)(4),1 7 which is South Carolina's murder for hire
provision.

8

The Georgia Supreme Court dealt with an almost identical problem of statutory construction in Whittington v. State.9 9 Georgia narrowed its definition under a similar statute 0 0 to prevent the inclusion
of defendants who have been motivated by another. 10 1 The Georgia
court believed the statute needed to be defined more narrowly to include only those acting as an employee.102
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Cain held that such a restriction was not constitutionally required. 03 Again relying on Zant v.
Stephens, the court stated, "Zant describes two constitutionally indispensable features of any aggravating circumstance: first, it 'must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty'; second,
it 'must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.' "104 The
court then proceeded to justify the imposition of the more severe sentence by referring to "agents" as having a "total lack of conscience," 05
by characterizing agent murders as "the product of a bankrupt human
conscience," °8 and by suggesting that the victim of an agent murderer
is "rendered even more helpless by his lack of suspicion of the
agent.'

' 10 7

The court failed to state how the class of murderers was "genuinely narrowed" by including "[o]ne who murders at the request or
motivation of another."'' 0 8 The court's decision in Cain warrants the

96. See id. ("Threatte's testimony unequivocally established that appellant's
mother motivated the murderers .... ").
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). The statute lists
as an aggravating circumstance any instance in which "[t]he offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other
thing of monetary value." Id.
98. Cain, 297 S.C. at 506-07, 377 S.E.2d at 561.
99. 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73 (1984).
100. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(6) (1988). The Georgia statute lists as an aggravating circumstance any instance in which the "offender caused or directed another to
commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person ......

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Whittington, 252 Ga. at 178, 313 S.E.2d at 82.
Id. at 178, 313 S.E.2d at 81.
Cain, 297 S.C. at 507, 377 S.E.2d at 561.
Id. (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)).
Id.
Id. at 507-08, 377 S.E.2d at 561.

107. Id. at 508, 377 S.E.2d at 561-62.
108. See id. at 507, 377 S.E.2d at 561.
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same criticism the United States Supreme Court delivered to the Georgia Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Georgia,109 In Godfrey the High
Court reversed a Georgia death sentence, stating that the Georgia Supreme Court failed to create "any inherent restraint on the arbitrary
and capricious infliction of the death sentence" because a person of
ordinary sensibility could reasonably find that almost every murder fit
the stated criteria established by the Georgia court." ° The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, apparently did not regard its decision as
broadening the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Instead,
the court narrowly focused on the fact that Cain "conceded the
'agency' factor narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.""' Thus, a possible justification for the court's failure to state
how the class is narrowed by its definition of agency could be the result
of what the court viewed as a concession from the defendant.
By its holding in Cain the South Carolina Supreme Court established potentially dangerous precedent for future use by prosecutors.
First, as long as prosecutors do not make any firm commitments to codefendants, the jury may perceive a testifying co-defendant as contrite,
rather than as one testifying out of self interest. Second, if a prosecutor
discovers that someone suggested or otherwise motivated a defendant
to commit a murder, the defendant then becomes an agent and the
death penalty becomes possible.
Richard R. Gleissner
IV.

COURT STRICTLY ENFORCES REQUIREMENT THAT TRIAL JUDGE
MAKE DETERMINATION AND INDICATE IN RECORD THAT DEFENDANT'S
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT

In State v. Bateman" 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that it is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine whether a
defendant has intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel." 3 Furthermore, the court held that when a defendant has indicated his desire to proceed pro se, the record must show the trial judge
conducted a hearing to determine whether the defendant's request was
accompanied by a competent waiver." 4 Because these requirements
were not met in Bateman, the supreme court reversed the conviction

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

446 U.S. 420 (1980).
Id. at 428-29.
Cain, 297 S.C. at 507, 377 S.E.2d at 561.
296 S.C. 367, 373 S.E.2d 470 (1988).
Id. at 369, 373 S.E.2d at 741.
Id.
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and remanded the case for a new trial. 115
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has required trial judges to
make determinations as to whether waivers have been knowingly and
intelligently made since the United States Supreme Court indicated in
' 6 that such determinations were necessary."17
Faretta v. California"
When trial courts have failed to demonstrate in the record that they
have made the determination, the supreme court consistently has reversed trial court decisions and remanded for new trials." 8
In Bateman six defendants were arrested and charged with trafficking in marijuana and conspiracy to traffic in marijuana. At the defendants' bond hearing, T.R. Bateman acted as spokesman for the entire group and informed the court that the group did not want an
attorney." 9 At the trial, the judge asked Bateman if he still served as
spokesman for the entire group of defendants and Bateman responded
affirmatively. Throughout the proceedings the judge recognized Bateman as the group's spokesman. The judge informed each of the defendants that they could participate, but aside from this comment he ad20
dressed the remaining defendants only to ascertain their identity.
Accordingly, the court reversed the six defendants' convictions and remanded for new trial because the judge failed to make a determination
of competent waiver of counsel."'
Subsequent to its decision in Bateman, the court decided State v.
Coto."' The one paragraph per curiam opinion in Coto did not provide
the facts of the case, but instead clearly and concisely reiterated the
rule that when "the record does not indicate, and no determination
was made, that [an] Appellant's waiver of counsel was knowing and
intelligent .
12

.

. ." the case will be reversed and remanded for a new

trial. '
In light of the broad rule announced in Coto, which apparently
was intended not to be limited to any particular fact situation, and the

115. Id.
116. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
117. See, e.g., State v. Loftin, 276 S.C. 48, 276 S.E.2d 575 (1981); State v. Dixon, 269

S.C. 107, 236 S.E.2d 419 (1977).
118. See, e.g., Loftin, 276 S.C. 48, 275 S.E.2d 575; State v. Massey, 277 S.C. 213, 284

S.E.2d 781 (1981).
119. Bateman, 296 S.C. at 368, 373 S.E.2d at 470.
120. Id. at 368-69, 373 S.E.2d at 471. At the bond hearing the judge spoke briefly
with another defendant about his ownership of the land on which the marijuana was
found. This same defendant made a closing argument. Other than this one exception,
essentially all communication between the trial judge and the defendants was conducted
through Bateman. Id.
121. Id. at 369, 373 S.E.2d at 471.
122. 296 S.C. 480, 374 S.E.2d 181 (1988) (per curiam).
123. Id. at 481, 374 S.E.2d at 181-82.
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obvious import of that rule as earlier indicated in Bateman, the South
Carolina Supreme Court clearly is determined to protect the rights of
pro se defendants and ensure that their waivers of counsel are knowing
and intelligent.
James Mauldin Gibson

V.
CONDITION OF PROBATION BARRING PROBATIONER FROM ALCOHOLSELLING ESTABLISHMENTS HELD UNREASONABLE AND DISPROPORTIONATE
TO REHABILITATIVE FUNCTION

In Beckner v. State"4 the South Carolina Supreme Court struck
down a condition of probation that barred a defendant from entering
any place of business that sold alcohol. The court's per curiam decision
was based on its finding that such a prohibition was not reasonable.

John Hawk Beckner "pled guilty to distribution of marijuana...
and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, suspended upon the service of five years with five years probation.""' A condition of his probation was that he would not "be in a place of business that sells alcohol. ' 126 Beckner challenged this condition at a post-conviction relief

(PCR) hearing, but the PCR judge upheld the condition."17 Beckner
appealed and the supreme court reversed.
The supreme court stated that while a trial judge has great discretion in imposing probation conditions under South Carolina Code section 24-21-430, 12 and although conditions are not limited to those in

124. 296 S.C. 365, 373 S.E.2d 469 (1988).
125. Id. at 366, 373 S.E.2d at 469.

126. Id.
127. See id.
128. South Carolina Code section 24-21-430 provides a partial list of conditions a
court may impose upon a probationer. The statute reads:
The court shall determine and may impose by order duly entered and may
at any time modify the conditions of probation and may include among them
any of the following or any other condition not herein prohibited.
The probationer shall:
(1) refrain from the violations of any state or federal penal laws;

(2) avoid injurious or vicious habits;
(3) avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful character;
(4) permit the probation officer to visit at his home or elsewhere;
(5) work faithfully at suitable employment as far as possible;
(6) pay a fine in one or several sums as directed by the court;
(7) perform public service work as directed by the court;
(8) submit to urinalysis or a blood test or both upon the request of the probation agent;
(9) submit to curfew restrictions;
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the statute,12 9 the conditions must be reasonable." 0 Furthermore, the
court recognized that "[tihe practical effect of the challenged condition
[was] to prohibit [Beckner] from entering or working in virtually every
grocery and convenience store in South Carolina.' 31 Also, the court
noted the condition would exclude Beckner from many restaurants. 32
The court thus concluded that the prohibition was unreasonable, since
the burden on Beckner was "greatly disproportionate to any rehabilita'' 3
tive function it [could] serve. 1
The court expressly noted, however, that its holding "does not
mean that other less restrictive conditions prohibiting entry into places
that sell alcohol may not be reasonable."' 34 The court cited three cases
in which less restrictive conditions geared toward achieving the same
result have been upheld."15 In People v. Smith"8 l a California court upheld a condition requiring a probationer to stay out of places where
alcohol was the chief item on sale. Similarly, a Florida court required
the probationer in Brown v. State 3 7 to stay away from bars. Finally, in
State v. Harrington"" the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a
condition that a probationer not frequent places that sell alcohol during certain hours.
Based on these authorities and the court's indication that it regards them as persuasive, it is unlikely that the reversal of the probation condition in Beckner will lead to a trend of such reversals. Indeed,
the decision might be expected to result in an increased number of
probations conditioned upon the probationer not entering certain alcohol-serving establishments. This result might be expected because al-

(10) submit to house arrest which is confinement in a residence for a period of
twenty-four hours a day, with only those exceptions as the court may expressly
grant in its discretion;
(11) submit to intensive surveillance which may include surveillance by electronic means;
(12) support his dependents; and
(13) follow the probation officer's instructions and advice regarding recreational and social activities.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-430 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
129. Beckner, 296 S.C. at 366, 373 S.E.2d at 469 (citing State v. Wilson, 274 S.C.

352, 264 S.E.2d 414 (1980)).
130. Id. (citing 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1571(8) (1961); 21 Am. JuR.
Law § 570 (1981)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 366 n.1, 373 S.E.2d at 469 n.1.
135. See id.

2D

Criminal

136. 145 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 193 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1983).
137. 406 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
138. 78 N.C. App. 39, 336 S.E.2d 852 (1985).
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though the court struck down the broad prohibition in Beckner, the
court for the first time expressly indicated its willingness to uphold a
similar, but less restrictive, prohibition against entering places that
serve alcohol.
Harold A. Oberman
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